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Abstract  
This study explores whether the experience rating of employers' disability  
insurance premiums affects the inflow of older employees to disability benefits in 
Finland. To identify the causal effect of experience rating, we exploit a pension 
reform that extended the coverage of the experience-rated premiums. The results 
show that a new disability benefit claim can cause substantial cost to the former 
employer through an increased premium. Nonetheless, we find no evidence of 
the significant effects of experience rating on the disability inflow. The lack of 
the behavioral effects may be due to the complexity of experience rating  
calculations and/or limited employer awareness. 
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Tiivistelmä  
Tutkimuksessa arvioidaan, vaikuttaako työantajan omavastuu työkyvyttömyys-
eläkkeiden kustannuksista työkyvyttömyysriskiin. Vaikutusten arvioinnissa  
hyödynnetään TyEL-uudistusta, jonka myötä omavastuukustannukset laajenivat 
koskemaan kaikkia yksityisiä suuryrityksiä. Tulosten perusteella yksittäinen uusi 
työkyvyttömyyseläke voi aiheuttaa huomattavia kustannuksia entiselle työn-
antajalle nostamalla yrityksen tulevaa työkyvyttömyyseläkemaksua. Tästä huo-
limatta omavastuukustannuksilla ei havaita olevan sanottavaa vaikutusta työky-
vyttömyyseläkkeiden alkavuuteen. Työantajamaksutekniikan mutkikkuuden ja  
TyEL-uudistuksen siirtymäsäännösten vuoksi työantajat eivät välttämättä ole ol-
leet täysin tietoisia omavastuukustannuksista, mikä voi selittää käyttäytymisvai-
kutusten puuttumista.  
  
Asiasanat: Maksuluokkamalli, työkyvyttömyyseläke, varhaiseläke 
JEL-luokittelu: J14, J26, H32 
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1 Introduction
Disability beneﬁt programs have attracted considerable interest among economists on both
sides of the Atlantic. This is not surprising, given the economic importance of these pro-
grams. For example in 2005, 26 million people in the European Union countries were on
disability beneﬁts, while in the United States 7.7 million people received beneﬁts through
the Social Security Disability Insurance program and 4.4 million through the Supplemen-
tary Security Income program (Benítez-Silva et al., 2010). Most economic studies of dis-
ability programs have focused on estimating the eﬀects of beneﬁt levels or eligibility criteria
on labor supply (e.g. Gruber, 2000; Black et al., 2002; Campolieti, 2004; Autor & Duggan,
2003, 2006; Karström et al., 2008; Kyyrä, 2010; Staubli 2011). Far less eﬀort has been
devoted to analyze the role of employers and their incentives, which is the topic of this
study.
When a worker applies for a disability beneﬁt, the employer typically has no direct
control over the decision that the medical professionals make. Nonetheless, the employer
can inﬂuence disability outcomes indirectly. For example, the employer may reduce the
onset of disabling illnesses at the workplace by investing in workplace health and safety, and
by allocating the workload appropriately between employees. When the worker anyway
develops a medical condition that reduces his or her working capacity, the employer has
the discretion of whether to provide physical aid or retraining or whether to modify the
worker's job tasks, which may enable the worker to remain at work. The problem is that
the employer's incentives to implement these types of measures can be weak even if their
costs to the employer were considerably less than the costs of a new disability beneﬁt
claimant to the society.
One policy option that may mitigate this problem is to require individual employers to
bear some of the costs of their employees' disability beneﬁt claims through experience-rated
disability insurance (DI) premiums. With experience rating, the employer's premium is
adjusted to reﬂect the costs of its workers' disability beneﬁt claims in comparison to other
employers. Employers with high disability costs are penalized through a surcharge on top
of the base premium, while employers with low disability costs are rewarded by giving
a discount on the base premium. If successful, experience rating induces employers to
improve their workplace health and safety, and encourages them to implement cost-eﬀective
accommodations that enable those employees who have health problems to remain on the
job. This should result in fewer individuals claiming disability beneﬁts. However, there is
no compelling evidence to what extent, if at all, the experience rating of the DI premiums
aﬀects the disability inﬂow.1 We address this question by quantifying the eﬀect of the
experience rating on the disability inﬂow of the older workers in Finland.
1There is an extensive literature on the eﬀects of experience rating in other forms of social security,
including workers' compensation for on-the-job injuries (e.g. Ruser, 1991; Bruce & Atkins, 1993; Kralj,
1994; Thomason & Pozzebon, 2002), unemployment insurance (e.g. Topel, 1983; Meyer, 2002, Anderson
& Meyer, 1993, 2000) and unemployment-related pensions (Hakola & Uusitalo, 2005). Given that the
employer has less control over disability outcomes than layoﬀs and workplace injuries, these studies do not
oﬀer much guidance for understanding the role of experience rating in DI.
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This topic is of considerable interest, as reforming disability programs are high on the
policy agenda of many governments and experience rating is viewed as a potentially eﬀec-
tive policy. For instance, Autor (2011) and Burkhauser & Daly (2011) have recently sug-
gested that the U.S. Social Security DI program should be ﬁnanced by an experience-rated
payroll tax. To motive this policy proposal, these authors rely on anecdotal evidence from
the Netherlands. Over the past two or three decades, the Netherlands has implemented
a series of disability program reforms, including the introduction of experience-rated DI
premiums in 1998. These reforms have been followed by sharp declines both in the dis-
ability inﬂow and in the share of the Dutch population on disability beneﬁts (for example,
see García-Gómez et al., 2011). However, due to the number of simultaneous changes that
confound the eﬀects of individual policy measures, it is not clear to what extent adopting
the experience rating explains these outcomes.2 The analysis of the Finnish DI system pro-
vides an alternative - perhaps one that is even better point of reference - for the discussion
of the eﬃciency of experience rating in DI.
In Finland, employers are subject to various degrees of experience rating depending on
the size of the ﬁrm. To identify the eﬀects of experience rating, we utilize a reform that
uniﬁed the major pensions Acts in the private sector in 2007. This reform had nothing to
do with experience rating, but it accidentally extended the coverage of experience rating
to certain new groups of workers and their employers. After this reform, medium-sized and
large ﬁrms began to pay experience-rated DI premiums for their employees who used to be
insured under speciﬁc pension Acts. In contrast, the smaller ﬁrms in the same industries
were not aﬀected but continued to pay ﬂat-rate DI premiums. As a consequence, we
can compare disability outcomes under the experience rating and ﬂat-rate schemes in a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences type of setting.
Using linked employer-employee data, we construct various measures of disability in-
ﬂows and compare their changes between the pre-reform and post-reform periods in the
ﬁrms of diﬀerent size. This analysis conducted at the ﬁrm level does not support the hy-
pothesis that experience rating reduces disability inﬂow. In the next stage, we compute
marginal costs for all the employees who were at risk of being awarded a disability beneﬁt.
The marginal cost is deﬁned here as the expected increase in the employer's future DI
premium that would result if a disability beneﬁt would have been awarded to the worker.
Before the 2007 reform, the marginal cost was zero for all the employees in all ﬁrms. In
the post-reform period, the marginal costs for the employees of medium-sized and large
ﬁrms became positive and increased over time due to the gradual adoption of the experi-
2Koning (2009) found that the disability inﬂow decreased in the Dutch ﬁrms that experienced a change
in the DI premium when compared to the ﬁrms with unchanged premiums. Koning interpreted this
as evidence that employers were not completely aware of experience rating and therefore the premium
change served as a wake-up call, which induced preventative measures that reduced the disability events
in the subsequent years. Since his data only covered the post-reform years, there were no exogenous
changes in the ﬁrms' premiums but all the changes were driven by the past change in the disability beneﬁt
claims made by the ﬁrm's own employees. While the results point to some behavioral responses and
information imperfections, the results do not describe the causal eﬀects of experience rating as compared
to the counterfactual case of the ﬂat-rate DI premiums, which we analyze in this study.
2
ence rating system. The resulting exogenous variation in the marginal costs allows us to
estimate the causal eﬀects of experience rating. We ﬁrst demonstrate that the marginal
cost can be high, being comparable in size to a worker's annual salary in many cases. The
marginal costs are particularly high for relatively young employees in large ﬁrms. Then
we add the marginal cost as an explanatory variable to various probability models for
transitions out of work. Consistently with our ﬁndings from the ﬁrm-level analysis, the
results from these models imply that experience rating has no eﬀect on the transition rate
to disability beneﬁts. Thus, in the light of our analysis, the eﬃciency of experience rating
as a disability prevention device seems questionable. This is perhaps an unexpected result,
given the size of the costs the employers are liable for. The lack of the behavioral eﬀects
may be due to the complexity of the premium calculations, limited employer awareness
and/or the transitional provisions associated with the pension reform.
This paper will proceed as follows: In the next section we discuss the disability beneﬁt
schemes and DI premiums in Finland. In Section 3 we describe the pension reform that
extended the coverage of experience rating. In Section 4 we describe the data and report
some descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the results of our ﬁrm-level analysis. In
Section 6 we discuss the computations of the marginal costs and report the results for the
individual-speciﬁc transition rates. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Institutional framework
2.1 Sickness and disability beneﬁts
An employee who is unable to perform his or her job due to illness or injury is entitled to
compensation for income loss. In order to receive this compensation, the applicant needs
a statement by a doctor certifying that he or she is not capable of work. For the ﬁrst
weeks (typically one to three months), the applicant is fully compensated by the employer,
after which he or she can claim a sickness beneﬁt. The sickness beneﬁt can be received
for a maximum of about one year (300 working days, Saturdays included). Depending
on the illness or the injury, the applicant's rehabilitation needs are assessed in a more
extensive medical examination during the sickness beneﬁt period. In case of prolonged
disability, an individual between the ages of 16 and 62 can qualify for one of four possible
disability beneﬁts: (i) a partial disability pension, (ii) a full disability pension, (iii) a
partial rehabilitation beneﬁt, or (iv) a full rehabilitation beneﬁt.
When it is unlikely that an applicant will return to work, he or she is awarded a
disability pension for an indeﬁnite period of time. Otherwise the applicant is entitled to
a rehabilitation beneﬁt (also known as a temporary disability pension), which is granted
only for a speciﬁc period. The receipt of this beneﬁt also requires that a rehabilitation
plan has been drafted. For both beneﬁt types, a full beneﬁt is conditional on a loss in the
working capacity of at least 60% and a partial beneﬁt for a loss of at least 40% but below
60%. Disability evaluations are always made by trained professionals. When determining
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eligibility, the individual's age, education, occupation, place of residence and capability to
support herself or himself by regular work are all taken into account along with the medical
assessment. A disability pension may also be discontinued if the working capacity of the
recipient improves, which rarely happens among older recipients. There is no automatic
retesting of the disability status, except for new periods of the rehabilitation beneﬁt. The
disability beneﬁts can be received until the age of 63 when the entitlement to an old-age
pension begins.
2.2 Disability insurance premiums
A major part of disability beneﬁt costs is ﬁnanced by partially experience-rated premiums
(or payroll taxes). The degree of experience rating depends on the ﬁrm size, as measured
by a ﬁrm's payroll two years earlier. Small ﬁrms are not subject to experience rating and
they only pay base premiums. The base premium is calculated by taking the sum of the
age-speciﬁc DI taxes over all employees:
Qkt =
∑
j
ζt(xjt)wjt, (1)
where k indexes the ﬁrm and t indexes the year, ζt is the DI tax rate,
3 and xjt and wjt are
the age and annual salary of employee j, respectively.
Large ﬁrms pay experience-rated premiums, which are calculated by multiplying the
base premium by the experience multiplier m
(
rk(t−2), rk(t−3)
)
. This multiplier takes a
value between 0.1 and 5.5, depending on the costs of the disability pension claims made
by the ﬁrm's former employees two to three years earlier. These costs are measured by
risk ratios rk(t−2) and rk(t−3), which are deﬁned below. On the basis of the average of
these risk ratios, the ﬁrm is allocated to one of 11 possible contribution categories, each
of which corresponds to a particular value of m. See the solid line in Figure 1.4 The
experience-rated premium mQkt can diﬀer substantially from the base premium Qkt. In
principle, a large ﬁrm can obtain a 90% discount on the base premium or be obligated to
pay a 450% surcharge on top of the base premium.
In contrast to small and large ﬁrms, medium-sized ﬁrms pay a weighted sum of the
base and experienced-rated premiums, and are thus only partially covered by the experience
rating. In general, the DI premium is calculated as
Ckt =
(
1− α(Wk(t−2))
)
Qkt + α(Wk(t−2))m
(
rk(t−2), rk(t−3)
)
Qkt, (2)
where Wk(t−2) is the payroll in year t − 2 and α is the degree of experience rating ; α is 0
for small ﬁrms with Wk(t−2) ≤ W t and 1 for large ﬁrms with Wk(t−2) ≥ W t, and between
3The age variation in the DI tax rate reﬂects the diﬀerences in the disability risk and the beneﬁt levels
across the age groups.
4A smoothed version of the multiplier (the dashed line in Figure 1) is used in our calculations. The
reasons for this will be explained later in Section 6.
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Figure 1: The experience multiplier in year t, m
(
rk(t−2), rk(t−3)
)
, as a function of the
average of the risk ratios in years t− 2 and t− 3, 12
(
rk(t−2) + rk(t−3)
)
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W t and W t it increases linearly from 0 to 1 with Wk(t−2). The threshold values for small
and large ﬁrms are updated annually, and they correspond approximately to the ﬁrm sizes
of 50 and 800 employees with the average salary.
The risk ratio is computed as
rkt =
∑
j∈Dkt ejt
Rkt
, (3)
where ejt is the present value of a (full or partial) disability pension awarded in year t,
and Dkt denotes the set of individuals who worked for the ﬁrm one to two calendar years
prior to the year of the retirement event.5 The retirement event refers to the day when
the individual was diagnosed with the disability leading to the disability pension. Due
to periods of sickness and rehabilitation beneﬁts, the retirement event is often one or two
years before the disability pension is awarded. The present value ejt equals the expected
amount of disability pension beneﬁts until the age of 63, i.e. the age when an old-age
pension begins. The numerator of the risk ratio is referred to as the realized disability
cost, as it is a measure of the expected present value of the disability pension claims made
by the ﬁrm's former employees during the year t. The denominator Rkt is the theoretical
disability cost and it corresponds to the average disability costs in the ﬁrms with the same
age and wage structure (see the Appendix). This means that if the new claims for disability
pension in a ﬁrm cause higher than the average costs to the pension system, rkt > 1, which
tend to push the experience multiplier above one with the delay of two to three years.
5If the individual had more than one employer during these two years, the contribution of ejt is divided
between the employers according to the share of salaries they have paid during that two-year period.
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It is noteworthy that the risk ratio only depends on the disability pension claims, not
on the rehabilitation beneﬁt claims. This may induce the employer to encourage those
employees with health problems to apply for a rehabilitation beneﬁt rather than for a
disability pension. Another important point is that only the ﬁrst disability pension of
each person is taken into account. In particular, if a worker collects a partial disability
pension and this is followed by a full disability pension, only the present value of the
partial pension has an eﬀect on the ﬁrm's risk ratio in the year when that pension was
awarded. To minimize the impacts on the risk ratio, the employer may thus encourage
those workers who have health problems to apply for a partial disability pension ﬁrst (i.e.
by providing part-time work for a short period of time). These two features of the risk
ratio calculations suggest that the eﬀect of the experience rating on the partial disability
pension claims and on the rehabilitation beneﬁt claims is ambiguous. To the extent that
experience rating leads to general improvements in the ﬁrm's health and safety policy, it
should reduce the transitions to all types of disability beneﬁts. However, the experience
rating may also increase the inﬂow to partial disability pension as well as the rehabilitation
beneﬁts in some cases through the substitution eﬀects.
Experience rating may also aﬀect the relative risk of becoming a disability pension
recipient between the employees of diﬀerent ages within large ﬁrms. This is because the
eﬀect of a new disability pension claim on the risk ratio is determined by the present value
of the pension beneﬁts, which is larger for young claimants who still have many years
before being eligible for old-age pensions. Thus, the employer has an incentive to devote
extra eﬀort to prevent its young employees from claiming disability pension beneﬁts.
3 TyEL reform and experience rating for former LEL em-
ployers
To estimate the eﬀects of the experience rating, we exploit a pension reform that uniﬁed the
private-sector Pension Acts in 2007. As a by-product of this reform, the experience rating
of the DI premiums was extended to cover new groups of workers and their employers.
Before the reform, all private-sector employees were covered either by the Employees'
Pension Act (TEL), the Temporary Employee's Pensions Act (LEL), or by the Pension
Act for Performing Artists and Certain Groups of Employees (TaEL). Whereas a vast
majority of these employees were insured under the TEL, the LEL covered dock workers
and blue-collar workers in the ﬁelds of construction, agriculture and forestry while the TaEL
covered artists, journalists and those who worked for households. The employers paid the
experience-rated DI premiums for their workers who were insured under the TEL.6 But
6The experience rating system changed in 2006 when the current system came into eﬀect for the TEL
workers. Before this reform, those ﬁrms employing more than 50 workers were required to pay a given share
of the present value of a new disability beneﬁt claim as a lump sum payment to the pension provider at the
time when the disability pension (or rehabilitation beneﬁt) was awarded to their former employee who was
insured under the TEL. The medium-sized ﬁrms paid only a small share of this present value. However,
in addition to the lump sum disability costs, they also paid the ﬂat-rate base premiums on an annual
6
for those workers insured under the LEL and the TaEL, the employers paid the ﬂat-rate
base premiums. That is, the experience rating system was only applied to the employers
of the TEL workers.
On January 1, 2007, these three pension Acts were uniﬁed into a single Employees
Pensions Act (TyEL). While this reform did not aﬀect the eligibility criteria or beneﬁt
levels, i.e. the content of DI from the employees' perspective, it did extend the experience-
rated DI premiums to also cover those worker groups who used to be insured under the
LEL and the TaEL. As a consequence, the former LEL employers and TaEL employers
whose payroll exceeded the threshold value of W t became subject to experience rating for
the ﬁrst time, whereas the smaller employers continued to pay only the base premiums.
This provides a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences type of setting, which we exploit to identify the
causal eﬀects of experience rating. In what follows, we focus on the workers insured under
the LEL and their employers.
In practice, due to speciﬁc rules for the transition period, the transition of the former
LEL employers to the experience rating scheme occurred gradually over time. The guiding
principle for the transitional provisions was that the present value of the new disability
pension claim aﬀects the risk ratio of the former LEL employer only to the extent the
underlying employment relationship falls in the TyEL period. Since the present value is
assigned to the ﬁrms in which the claimant worked one to two calendar years prior to
the year of the retirement event, only disability pensions with the retirement event in the
year 2008 or later have an eﬀect on the risk ratio of the former employer. The costs of
disability pensions that were awarded during the TyEL period but were not assigned to any
particular employer are pooled, i.e. collectively covered by all the former LEL employers.
To account for this pooling, the risk ratios of the former LEL employers in the transition
period were adjusted by adding a calculatory term to the numerator. Namely, the adjusted
risk ratio for ﬁrm k in year t ≥ 2008 is computed as
rAkt =
∑
j∈Dkt ejt + Ekt
Rkt
, (4)
where ejt is accounted only to the extent that the underlying employment relationship
fell in the TyEL period, and Ekt is the calculatory term, which is positive in the years
2008-2010 (see the Appendix for details).
Figure 2 illustrates how the present value of a new disability pension claim ejt is
assigned to the former employers in diﬀerent cases. For example, let us consider worker
A who was awarded a disability pension in year 2008 due to an illness diagnosed in 2007
at the beginning of his or her sickness period. The year of the retirement event is 2007,
suggesting that the present value would have aﬀected the risk ratios of the ﬁrms for which
she worked in the years 2006 and 2005 (i.e. ﬁrm k), had the TyEL been in force for a longer
basis. In other words, prior to 2006, there were no experience-rated DI premiums but the medium-sized
and large ﬁrms paid lump sump payments for the disability beneﬁt claims made by their former employees
insured under the TEL. Korkeamäki & Kyyrä (2012) discuss this old system and provide evidence for its
behavioral eﬀects.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the allocation of disability pension costs for the former LEL
employers
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time. But, as both 2005 and 2006 are LEL years, the present value is not assigned to her
employer but is jointly covered by all the former LEL employers. Next, let us consider
workers B and D who retired one year later from the same ﬁrm but with diﬀerent sickness
and rehabilitation beneﬁt proﬁles. The year of the retirement event for both workers is
2008. Assuming they earned the same salary in the years 2006 and 2007, only one-half
of the present values of their disability pensions (i.e. 2007 share) is accounted for when
calculating the risk ratios for ﬁrm k. In the case of worker B (D) the risk ratio is aﬀected
in the year 2009 (2011), which aﬀects the experience-rated premium for the years 2011 and
2012 (2013 and 2014). A two-year period of rehabilitation beneﬁts for worker D causes
a rather long gap of three years between the retirement event and the change in the risk
ratio.
In general, only disability pensions with the retirement event in 2009 or later (workers
C and E in Figure 2) have a full impact on the former employer's risk ratio. In the case of
worker C the present value is split between ﬁrms k and s according to the wages these ﬁrms
paid to the worker in years 2007 and 2008. It is worth noting that the present value of
worker E's disability pension is based on the assumption that a partial disability pension
would have lasted from 2009 until the time when the worker reaches the age of 63, so that
only a (possibly very small) portion of the actual disability costs is assigned to ﬁrm k when
computing its risk ratio for the year 2009, whereas a transition to a full disability pension
in 2011 has no eﬀect at all.
It is obvious that the calculatory term dominates the numerator of the adjusted risk
ratio in 2008. This is because ej08 > 0 only if the retirement event was in the same year
when the disability pension was awarded, which is applicable to only 17% of the cases.
Furthermore, the relative weight of the calculatory term declines gradually to zero by
2010.
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Table 1: Sample statistics for ﬁrm data
Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
# of ﬁrms 573 597 627 663 663 663
# of ﬁrms with α > 0 80 93 98 105 117 128
Mean ﬁrm size 38.2 43.2 53.6 56.5 46.4 49.9
Median ﬁrm size 20 21 22 22 21 22
Mean α for ﬁrms with α > 0 0.180 0.199 0.207 0.202 0.197 0.191
Notes: Firm size is the number of all employees, regardless of the pension Act under which they are insured.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
The data were compiled by merging various administrative registers of the Finnish Centre
for Pensions, which co-ordinates the entire pension system in Finland. The data include
comprehensive records on employment periods and the wages for all the Finns who had
some work history, as well as the detailed pension information for all retirees. Each em-
ployment relationship can also be matched to the ﬁrm records on the industry, payroll and
the number of employees. However, apart from age, the data do not contain background
information for individuals, nor is there information on the receipt of sickness beneﬁts.
But we do observe the retirement events, that is, the days when a diagnosis was made for
the illness or disability that eventually led to a rehabilitation beneﬁt or disability pension.
This is important because the disability pension costs are assigned to the employers on the
basis of the year of the retirement event.
Our analysis covers the period 2005-2010, but in order to compute the risk ratios and
marginal costs, information is also needed from earlier years. First, we selected all workers
insured under the LEL in 2005 and 2006. From the years 2007 to 2010, we included
workers who would presumably have been insured under the LEL in the absence of the
TyEL reform. Next, we traced the employers of these workers. The smallest employers
were excluded by requiring that the ﬁrm employed at least 10 LEL workers each year
during the period 2005-2010. For each ﬁrm in a given year we also need the payroll from
two years earlier (to determine the value of α) as well as the information on the wages
and ages for its LEL employees over the past four-year period (to compute the risk ratios).
Due to some missing records, the ﬁrms included in the analysis do not necessarily appear
in the data each year.
The resulting panel includes 663 ﬁrms, of which 573 are continuously observed over
the period 2005-2010. On average, these ﬁrms are rather small. The mean size of the
workforce varies over time, ranging from 38 to 57 workers (Table 1). The median ﬁrm
size, however, is much smaller, being around 21 workers every year. About one-sixth of
the ﬁrms have positive α, and thereby transferred gradually from the ﬂat-rate scheme to
the experience-rated scheme during the years 2007-2010. As these ﬁrms are by deﬁnition
relatively large, a much larger share of the workers than the ﬁrms in the sample became
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Table 2: Sample statistics for worker data
Year at risk
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
# of workers 8479 10016 10403 11451 11156
Mean age 52.2 52.4 52.5 52.4 52.5
Mean job tenure 9.6 8.9 9.2 8.9 9.4
Industry:
Manufacturing 14.3 11.0 10.6 8.0 7.7
Building construction 40.3 48.1 48.1 46.8 46.3
Civil engineering 5.1 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.8
Specialized construction 18.0 16.8 17.1 18.1 19.3
Transport and storage 15.5 13.1 13.2 12.4 11.4
Other 6.8 5.6 5.7 9.5 9.5
Fraction of workers with α > 0 0.591 0.631 0.627 0.629 0.629
Mean α for those with α > 0 0.546 0.630 0.614 0.596 0.569
# of transitions to:
partial rehabilitation beneﬁt 2 0 1 1 0
full rehabilitation beneﬁt 94 81 93 98 105
partial disability pension 10 16 18 13 17
full disability pension 58 69 84 90 77
# of ﬁrms in year t− 1 561 586 613 655 657
Mean ﬁrm size in year t− 1 39.6 45.9 58.6 46.7 50.2
Median ﬁrm size in year t− 1 21 22 22 21 22
Notes: Firm characteristics are for the ﬁrm for which the individual worked for the two years prior to the
present year. Firm size is the number of all employees, regardless of the pension Act under which they are
insured.
exposed to experience rating after the TyEL reform (over 60%, see Table 2).
In the individual-level analysis we focus on an older subgroup of LEL workers who
fulﬁll certain conditions. To be included in the risk set in year t ∈ {2006, 2007, ..., 2010} ,
we require that the individual (i) was between the ages of 45 and 61, (ii) had not received
any pension beneﬁts before the year t, and (iii) had been working during the years t − 1
and t− 2 (or in the TyEL period would have been working) under the LEL scheme for the
same employer that was included in the ﬁrm panel. The younger workers are excluded from
the analysis due to their very small risk of disability. The tenure restriction is required in
order to detect employer whose risk ratio will be aﬀected if a disability pension is awarded
to the worker. It is noteworthy that the individual at risk in year t does not necessarily
work during that year (for example, due to a sick leave or layoﬀ).
The worker data include 18,197 individuals in 661 ﬁrms. The average age of the worker
at risk is slightly higher than 52 years each year (see Table 2). On average, the workers
had worked at their current ﬁrms for 9 to 10 years. Approximately two-thirds of these
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Table 3: Risk set and transitions out of work by age
Number of observations Transition rates
Risk Rehab Disab Other Rehab Disab Other
Age set beneﬁt Pension exit beneﬁt Pension exit
45 3478 13 2 253 0.0037 0.0006 0.0727
46 3496 25 1 270 0.0072 0.0003 0.0772
47 3378 18 3 237 0.0053 0.0009 0.0702
48 3354 32 2 224 0.0095 0.0006 0.0668
49 3313 17 3 205 0.0051 0.0009 0.0619
50 3273 29 3 194 0.0089 0.0009 0.0593
51 3324 42 11 205 0.0126 0.0033 0.0617
52 3203 31 15 196 0.0097 0.0047 0.0612
53 3184 24 14 189 0.0075 0.0044 0.0594
54 3158 33 22 169 0.0104 0.0070 0.0535
55 3163 37 20 180 0.0117 0.0063 0.0569
56 3083 39 26 172 0.0127 0.0084 0.0558
57 3020 40 54 215 0.0132 0.0179 0.0712
58 2915 35 59 215 0.0120 0.0202 0.0738
59 2623 40 67 264 0.0152 0.0255 0.1006
60 2186 15 79 182 0.0069 0.0361 0.0833
61 1794 5 71 166 0.0028 0.0396 0.0925
All 51,945 475 452 3536 0.0091 0.0087 0.0681
Notes: The risk set consists of all individuals who worked in the same ﬁrm for the past two calender
years. Other exits include transitions to all other destinations than disability beneﬁts. Transition rates
are obtained by dividing the number of transitions to the state into question by the number of individuals
in the risk set.
workers were employed in one of three construction industries, and thus the data represent
only a narrow sector of the economy. Over 60% of the individuals were employed in a ﬁrm
with α > 0 and consequently, they were aﬀected by the experience rating system during
the TyEL period. Furthermore, the average degree of experience rating within this group
varies between 0.57 and 0.63 during the TyEL years.
By the end of the observation period, 927 workers had left the labor market to collect
disability beneﬁts. Most of these workers were awarded a full disability pension. The
numbers of the recipients of partial beneﬁts is relatively small: 74 workers were awarded
a partial disability pension and only 4 were awarded a partial rehabilitation beneﬁt. This
makes a distinct analysis of the transitions to partial beneﬁts infeasible, and for this reason
we do not usually make a distinction between those receiving partial and those receiving
full beneﬁts.
Table 3 shows the size of the risk set and the number of transitions to the diﬀerent
exit destinations as well as the corresponding transition rates by age. Not surprisingly,
the number of people at risk declines sharply with age. Only a small part of that decline
can be explained by transitions to disability beneﬁts. While the average transition rates
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Figure 3: The transition rate to disability beneﬁts (rehabilitation beneﬁt or disability
pension) as a function of age in the pre-reform and post-reform periods
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to rehabilitation beneﬁts and disability pension are of the same level, being about 0.009,
the age pattern is rather diﬀerent. Workers who are 56 years and under are much more
likely to be granted a rehabilitation beneﬁt than a disability pension, whereas the opposite
occurs for the older age group, which is more likely to be granted a disability pension,
not a rehabilitation beneﬁt. The likelihood of becoming a disability pension recipient is
particularly pronounced at ages 60 and 61. These observations are not surprising, given
that the cost-beneﬁt analysis of rehabilitation measures favors the younger workers who
have a longer potential working career.
The other exit refers to the case where the individual left the ﬁrm without becoming
a recipient of disability beneﬁts. This outcome is a kind of residual state, which includes
layoﬀs, employer changes and all states outside the labor force other than being on disability
beneﬁts. On average, 7% of workers leave their ﬁrm each year without claiming disability
beneﬁts. This rate varies less with age than does the transition rates to the disability
beneﬁts.
Figure 3 plots the overall transition rate to disability beneﬁts as a function of age for
the years 2005-2006 (pre-reform period) and 2008-2010 (post-reform period). The year
2007 is excluded, which was the ﬁrst TyEL year but that particular year was when the
experience rating did not yet have an eﬀect. In both periods, the disability risk is ﬁrst
very low but increases with age, reaching the level of about 0.04 by age 60. Compared to
the pre-reform period, the disability risk in the post-reform period is similar until the age
of 53 years, but is slightly lower at older ages (except at ages 57 and 61). As a result, the
average disability risk declined from 0.021 to 0.018 between the pre-reform and post-reform
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periods. This decline is not necessarily related to the adoption of experience rating because
the overall disability risk has been declining since 2003.
5 Risk ratios and disability inﬂow rates
The risk ratios measure the relative costs of the disability pension claims accounting for
diﬀerences in the age structure of the workforce between ﬁrms. The risk ratios also de-
termine the experience-rated premiums during the TyEL period, and hence should be of
direct economic interest for the ﬁrms that were aﬀected by the reform. The TyEL reform
in 2007 may have encouraged large ﬁrms to adopt measures to reduce their risk ratios in
order to gain from a lower DI premium in the future. Since the reform did not aﬀect the
incentives of the small ﬁrms that kept on paying ﬂat-rate base premiums, the risk ratios of
the large ﬁrms should have declined in comparison to those of the unaﬀected small ﬁrms.
Moreover, as the ﬁnancial gain from a lower risk ratio is positively related to the degree
to which the DI premium is experience-rated in the TyEL period (as measured by α), the
relative drop in the risk ratio among the larger ﬁrms is expected to be proportional to the
ﬁrm's α.7
These hypotheses are tested by applying the following two-period model:
rkt = ψ + λ · t+ η · W¯kt + µ ·Xkt + θ · (α¯kt · t) + εkt, (5)
where k indexes the ﬁrm and t indexes the time period, being 0 for the LEL-period 2005-
2006 and 1 for the TyEL-period 2008-2010 (excluding the ﬁrst TyEL year of 2007 when the
experience rating had no eﬀect yet). The outcome variable rkt is the average unadjusted
risk ratio during a period t,8 which is a measure of the relative disability pension costs that
were caused to the pension system by the ﬁrm's former employees. On the right-hand side,
Xkt is the vector of industry dummies, W¯kt is the average payroll, α¯kt is the average degree
of experience rating during period t, and εkt is the error term. Because α¯kt is a function
of the payroll, and because the ﬁrm size (for which W¯kt is a proxy) may also have a direct
eﬀect on the disability outcomes, it is important that the possible payroll eﬀect is controlled
for. With W¯kt held constant, the eﬀect of the experience rating is captured by θ. Since α¯kt
does not occur during the period 0, the eﬀects of W¯kt and α¯kt are easily sorted out. The
change in the average risk ratio from period 0 to period 1 that is unrelated to experience
rating is captured by λ, which is identiﬁed from the data on the small ﬁrms for which
7Comparing the changes in the risk ratios may seem odd because the risk ratio is a relative measure.
However, the reference level of disability pension costs, i.e. the theoretical disability cost in the risk
ratio formula, describes the average disability pension cost across all similar ﬁrms in the private sector.
Because the former LEL employers are a relatively small group, this reference level is mainly determined
by disability outcomes in other ﬁrms.
8The unadjusted risk ratio refers to the risk ratio that has been computed as if the TyEL would have
been in force for a long time. That is, we do not include the calculatory term in the risk ratio but instead
also assign the realized disability costs that are associated with the employment relationships that occurred
during the LEL period to the employer. Due to some outliers for a few small ﬁrms, the year-speciﬁc risk
ratios were top coded at the 99th percentile.
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Figure 4: The change in the average unadjusted risk ratio from 2005-2006 to 2008-2010,
rk1 − rk0, (y-axis) versus the average degree of experience rating, α¯k1, (x-axis).
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α¯kt = 0 in both periods. Under the plausible assumption that α¯kt is uncorrelated with the
error term, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of θ has a causal interpretation.
Before turning to the regression results, it is illustrative to consider the scatter plot in
Figure 4 that depicts α¯k1 against rk1−rk0.9 The change in the average risk ratio is strikingly
large for several small ﬁrms with α¯k1 = 0 . This is because the small ﬁrms generally have
a much wider range of the risk ratios than the large ﬁrms do. It is diﬃcult to detect any
relationship between the change in the risk ratio and the degree of experience rating in
the graph. In particular, we do not see a negative association between these variables that
would support our hypothesis. The OLS estimates of θ in Table 4 conﬁrm this observation.
Model 1 corresponds to the baseline speciﬁcation in (5). This is followed by a model
with a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the ﬁrm-size eﬀect (the 3rd order polynomial for the
payroll). The eﬀect of experience rating in both models is statistically insigniﬁcant (with
a wrong sign). In the last two models we relax the restriction that the change in the
risk ratio among the large ﬁrms is linearly related to the degree of experience rating. The
coeﬃcient on the dummy variable for the experience-rated ﬁrms in Model 3 suggests that
the risk ratios changed identically in both those ﬁrms that became subject to experience
rating and in those ﬁrms that were not aﬀected by the TyEL reform. In Model 4, a non-
monotone eﬀect for the degree of the experience rating is allowed for by using dummy
9For expositional purposes, the graph does not include those four small ﬁrms with α¯k1 = 0 for which
the absolute change in the average risk ratio is greater than 50.
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Table 4: The eﬀect of the degree of experience rating on the average unadjusted risk ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeﬀ t Coeﬀ t Coeﬀ t Coeﬀ t
α¯kt · t 0.3407 0.58 0.7474 0.96
1 (α¯kt · t > 0) -0.0005 -0.00
1 (α¯kt · t ∈ (0, .15]) -0.0928 -0.28
1 (α¯kt · t ∈ (.15, .5]) 0.2237 0.33
1 (α¯kt · t > .5) 0.6156 0.90
Payroll control: Linear Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial
Notes: Models were estimated by Ordinary Least Squares. The data contains 1146 observations on 573
ﬁrms. 1 (A) is 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise. All models include industry dummies. Model 1 also includes
the payroll, whereas Models 2 to 4 include the 3rd order polynomial for payroll. The t statistics are based
on the robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level.
variables for the three distinct intervals of α¯k1 (these intervals were chosen on the basis of
the number of the available observations). The coeﬃcients on these dummy variables do
not exhibit a clear pattern, nor do they diﬀer from zero at the conventional risk levels.
None of the models that were considered provides support for the hypothesis that
the realized disability costs in the TyEL period would have declined in the ﬁrms that
were exposed to experience rating as compared to the non-aﬀected ﬁrms.10 However, the
changes in the risk ratios may not reveal the whole story. This is because the risk ratio
reﬂects only the disability pension costs, but the experience rating may also aﬀect the
rehabilitation beneﬁt claims. For these reasons, to complete our analysis, we also examine
the relationship between the degree of experience rating and the inﬂow rates of older
workers to diﬀerent disability beneﬁts.
The dependent variable here is the share of 45 to 61 years old workers who were
awarded a given type of disability beneﬁt. We include only those ﬁrms that employed
at least ﬁve workers in the relevant age category each year, even though the results are not
sensitive to this restriction. The outcome variable is bounded between zero and one, and
its distribution has a mass point at zero. To address with these data features, we follow
Papke & Wooldridge (1996) and specify a fractional logit model of the form
E
(
y¯kt
∣∣W¯kt,Xkt, α¯kt, t) = Λ (ψ + λ · t+ η · W¯kt + µ ·Xkt + θ · (α¯kt · t)) , (6)
where y¯kt is the average annual inﬂow rate in period t (the years 2005-2006 or 2008-2010)
and Λ(z) ≡ exp(z)/ [1− exp(z)] is the logistic function. The annual inﬂow rate equals
the fraction of the older employees who were awarded a certain type of disability beneﬁt
(disability pension or rehabilitation beneﬁt). To be included in the ﬁrm's risk set in a
given year, the worker had to be employed by the ﬁrm for the past two calender years (but
not necessarily during the current year). This deﬁnition allows a one-year sickness beneﬁt
10Estimating the models by the Fixed Eﬀect method leads to the same conclusion.
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Table 5: The average partial eﬀect of the degree of experience rating on the average inﬂow
rates to rehabilitation beneﬁts and disability pension
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
APE z APE z APE z APE z
A. Rehab beneﬁt inﬂow
α¯kt · t 0.0050 1.29 0.0033 0.74
1 (α¯kt · t > 0) 0.0016 0.94
1 (α¯kt · t ∈ (0, .15]) 0.0015 0.82
1 (α¯kt · t ∈ (.15, .5]) 0.0013 0.44
1 (α¯kt · t > .5) 0.0036 0.77
B. Disab pension inﬂow
α¯kt · t -0.0013 -0.51 -0.0039 -1.19
1 (α¯kt · t > 0) -0.0010 0.61
1 (α¯kt · t ∈ (0, .15]) -0.0014 0.84
1 (α¯kt · t ∈ (.15, .5]) 0.0035 1.18
1 (α¯kt · t > .5) -0.0065 1.59
Payroll control: Linear Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial
Notes: The models were estimated by maximizing the Bernoulli quasi-likelihood function. The sample
includes 664 observations on 332 ﬁrms employing at least 5 workers aged 45-61 in each year between 2005
and 2010. 1 (A) is 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise. All models include industry dummies and the average
age of the employees between age 45 and 61. Model 1 also includes the payroll, whereas Models 2 to
4 include the 3rd order polynomial for payroll. Reported estimates are average partial eﬀects (APEs) or
average marginal eﬀects. In Model 1 the APE is the partial derivative of the expected inﬂow rate, averaged
across ﬁrms subject to experience rating in period 1. In Models 2, 3 and 4 the APE is the diﬀerence in
the expected inﬂow rate compared to the case of no experience rating, averaged across ﬁrms subject to
experience rating in period 1. The z statistics are based on the robust standard errors clustered at the
ﬁrm level.
period between the worker's exit from work and his or her receipt of a disability beneﬁt.
Here Xkt does not only include the industry dummies, but also the average age of the
ﬁrm's relevant workforce (i.e. employees aged 45 to 61 with at least two years of tenure).
We estimate the model by maximizing the Bernoulli quasi-likelihood function. The
resulting estimator is consistent regardless of the conditional distribution of y¯kt. That is,
we only specify the conditional expectation but leave the conditional distribution of the
outcome variable unspeciﬁed. Apart from the logit transformation Λ(·) and one additional
control variable, the modeling setting and the considered speciﬁcations are similar to the
linear risk ratio models that were discussed above.
The results are shown in Table 5. We only report the average partial eﬀect (APE)
of the experience rating variable, which is deﬁned as the eﬀect on the expected value of
y¯kt averaged across the ﬁrms subject to experience rating during period 1. That is, we
consider the average eﬀect of the experience rating on the disability inﬂow during the TyEL
period among the ﬁrms that became exposed to experience rating. When interpreting the
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estimates, one should note that the average inﬂow rates are rather low. For example,
during the TyEL period, these are approximately 0.008 and 0.010 for rehabilitation and
disability pension beneﬁts, respectively.
Panel A shows the eﬀects on the rehabilitation beneﬁt claims. These eﬀects appear
to be positive in all the model speciﬁcations, but none of them is statistically signiﬁcant.
The eﬀects on the disability pension inﬂow (Panel B) are negative except for the ﬁrms
with 0.15 < α¯k1 ≤ 0.5 in the last speciﬁcation, but they do not diﬀer from zero at the
conventional risk levels. These results are not sensitive with respect to our decision to
combine partial beneﬁts and full beneﬁts. The distinct models for the inﬂows into partial
and full beneﬁts also did not produce signiﬁcant eﬀects (not reported here). We thus
conclude that the disability inﬂow rates of the older employees in the TyEL period did
not change diﬀerently in the ﬁrms that became subject to experience rating and in those
smaller ﬁrms that were not aﬀected by the reform.
6 Marginal costs of disability pension claims
In this section, we examine the economic incentives at the employer-employee level. We
deﬁne the marginal cost of a new disability pension claim as the expected increase in the
employer's future DI premium. This can be computed for each worker who is at the risk
of becoming disabled. The marginal cost measures the cost of a new disability pension
claimant to his or her former employer, and how this cost varies across workers and ﬁrms.
The distribution of these costs is of obvious interest. In addition, the marginal costs
provide an alternative way to examine the potential eﬀects of experience rating. Using the
marginal cost as a regressor in various probability models, we test whether the disability
cost risk explains job tenure and the transitions from work to disability beneﬁts.
6.1 Computing marginal costs
Let us assume that a disability pension is awarded in year t ≥ 2008 to worker j who worked
in ﬁrm k. The marginal cost of this event to the former employer is
cjkt = Et
[
δ2(Cjk(t+2) − Ck(t+2)) + δ3(Cjk(t+3) − Ck(t+3))
]
, (7)
where δ is the annual discount factor, Cjks is the DI premium in year s given that the
pension was awarded to worker j in year t, and Cks is the counterfactual premium, had
the worker continued to work without receiving disability beneﬁts until the end of year
t + 3. At the beginning of year t, the employer does not know the future values of the
components of the DI premium formula, which explains the expectation operator in (7).
Let us further assume that the employer knows all the historical values, and uses the latest
realized values of the payroll and base premium, Wk(t−1) and Qk(t−1), to predict their
future values. Now, by substituting (2) into (7) and replacing all the future values with
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their expected values, we ﬁnd that
cjkt = α(Wk(t−1))Qk(t−1)
(
δ2
[
m
(
rˆAkt +4rˆAjkt , rAk(t−1)
)
−m
(
rˆAkt, r
A
k(t−1)
)]
+δ3
[
m
(
rˆAk(t+1), rˆ
A
kt +4rˆAjkt
)
−m
(
rˆAk(t+1), rˆ
A
kt
)])
, (8)
where rˆAkt and rˆ
A
k(t+1) are the expected counterfactual risk ratios, had the worker continued
to work until the end of year t+ 3, and 4rˆAjkt is the expected change in the risk ratio that
would result from worker j's disability pension claim in year t.11 In what follows, we set
δ = 1/1.03 but compute all the other parameters in (8) from the data. Here we discuss the
most important aspects of these computation. The details are provided in the Appendix.
It is evident that the key parameter is the expected change in the risk ratio, 4rˆAjkt .
A disability pension awarded in year t may or may not increase the numerator of the
employer's risk ratio in that year, depending on the year of the retirement event (the year
when the disabling illness was diagnosed). If the year of the retirement event is 2009 or
later, the expected increase in the numerator equals eˆjt, the expected present value of
disability pension beneﬁts until the age of 63. If the year of the retirement event is 2008,
only a part of eˆjt (we assume one-half) is accounted for when determining the employer's
risk ratio. And if the year of the retirement event is 2007 or earlier, the disability event has
no eﬀect on the employer's risk ratio. We estimate eˆjt using data on the disability pension
beneﬁts of the workers who retired at diﬀerent ages. Note that the year of the retirement
event is a latent variable as it is only observed if the disability pension was actually awarded
in year t. However, we need to compute cjkt for all the individuals. To address this issue,
we assume that with a certain probability the impact of a new disability pension on the
risk ratio is only partial (corresponding the case when the year of the retirement event is
2008) or non-existent (the case when the retirement event is before the year 2008). We
estimate these probabilities using the observed diﬀerences in the years of the retirement
event and the pension receipt among those who were awarded a disability pension. Let
φˆt denote the probability that eˆjt is assigned to the former employer (taking into account
the case when only one-half of eˆjt is assigned to the employer) if a disability pension is
awarded to worker j in year t. Now, we can write
4rˆAjkt =
φˆteˆjt
Rˆkt
, (9)
where Rˆkt is the expected theoretical disability cost and φˆteˆjt is the expected realized cost
of a new disability pension. The expected change in the risk ratio decreases with age (as
eˆjt decreases with age) and ﬁrm size (as Rˆkt increases with ﬁrm size), and increases with
11We assume that the disability pension awarded to worker j in year t does not aﬀect rˆAk(t+1). In
principle, it may have an eﬀect through a change in the age and wage structure of the workforce aﬀecting
the theoretical disability cost and calculatory term (see the formula in the Appendix). Nonetheless, such
an eﬀect is negligible for large ﬁrms, while it is of no consequence for the smaller ﬁrms that are not subject
to a notable degree of experience rating.
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time (as φˆt increases with t).
It is not obvious what we should assume about the expected counterfactual risk ratios,
rˆAkt and rˆ
A
k(t+1). The latest realized value, r
A
k(t−1), would be a problematic choice. It ignores
the gradually diminishing role of the calculatory term in the risk ratio formula, and it
would be a particularly poor predictor for relatively small ﬁrms because disability events
among their employees are rare and their risk ratios are volatile. The risk ratio in the
small ﬁrm soars at a high level in the year when the disability pension is awarded, but
usually declines in the next year. Instead of using the latest realized value, we use the
collective risk ratio of all LEL employers (the average risk ratio computed by the pension
provider), which we then adjust for the transitional provisions.12 The resulting estimates
of rˆAkt and rˆ
A
k(t+1) are independent of the ﬁrm's own disability experience, which enhances
the identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀects of the marginal costs in the econometric analysis.
We have computed two versions of the marginal costs using diﬀerent versions of the
experience multiplier m. The ﬁrst is based on the step-function version of the experience
multiplier (the solid line in Figure 1), while the second is based on the smoothed function
(the dashed line). In the former case, the marginal cost is often zero for the employees
of large ﬁrms, as the impact of a new pension claim on the risk ratio, 4rˆAjkt , is typically
too low to raise m. This feature is problematic and unrealistic for two reasons. First, a
disability pension for one worker increases the probability that the next disability event
in the same year will increase m. The rational employer should take this into account.
Second, the employer does not know the relevant risk ratios.13 The employer probably
knows the current value of m and perhaps its determinants rk(t−2) and rk(t−3), but does
not know the risk ratios that determine the value of m in years t+ 2 and t+ 3. Therefore
the employer cannot accurately assess whether or not a new pension claim made by a given
worker this year will increase the future m. Due to this uncertainty about the number of
new disability pension claims within the year and about the future values of the risk ratios,
the employers should worry each possible disability case and this should also be reﬂected
in our incentive measure.
Additional problem that arises with the step-function version of m is that the marginal
costs become very sensitive with respect to the assumed values of rˆAkt and rˆ
A
k(t+1). To
illustrate this, let us consider a large ﬁrm, so that 4rˆAjkt is very small for all its employ-
ees. Now, suppose that the average of rˆAkt and rˆ
A
k(t+1) (or that of rˆ
A
kt and r
A
k(t−1)) is only
marginally below the threshold value after which m rises to the next level. In this case, a
new disability pension claim, despite its modest eﬀect on the risk ratio, invariably raises m,
resulting in high marginal costs for all employees of the ﬁrm (as the eﬀect of the increase
in m is proportional to the payroll). However, with slightly diﬀerent values assumed for
rˆAkt and rˆ
A
k(t+1), this situation may not happen in which case the marginal cost is zero for
12Another alternative was considered where the counterfactual risk ratios are based on the ﬁrm's own
three-year disability history. However, the results were not altered when these counterfactual risk ratios
were used.
13The employer may ask the past values of its risk ratios from the pension provider. However, the
marginal cost depends on the future risk ratios, which are not yet deﬁned at the beginning of year t.
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all these employees. Because there are no obvious values for these risk ratios, the marginal
costs based on the step-function version of m are essentially arbitrary.
For these reasons we prefer the smoothed version ofm to the step-function version. The
use of the smoothed version provides a less extreme alternative by placing positive values
for many otherwise zero marginal costs and by cutting extremely high values of marginal
costs. A major advantage of this approach is that the marginal costs are not sensitive with
respect to the assumed values of rˆAkt and rˆ
A
k(t+1). In fact, the only role of these risk ratios
is to restrict the value of m to the interval [0.1, 5.5], which boundaries are rarely binding
for large ﬁrms. It follows that the marginal cost is determined primarily by a worker's age,
ﬁrm size and time period. By using the smoothed version of m, we mimic the situation
in which the employer knows its current m and the likely increase in the risk ratio, 4rˆAjkt ,
but is uncertain of the counterfactual risk ratios and hence the distance to the threshold
value for the next level of m. In the subsequent analysis, we report only the results for the
marginal costs that are based on the smoothed version of m.
6.2 Descriptive evidence
Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution function of marginal costs for the employees of
experience-rated ﬁrms during the last three years of the observation period (before 2008
the marginal costs are zero by construction). In 2008, there are no considerably high
values, and the mass of the marginal costs are close to zero. This was expected since a
disability pension awarded in 2008 aﬀects the employer's risk ratio only if the retirement
event occurred in the same year, which probability is about 0.17. Even in that case, the
eﬀect is relatively small because one-half of the present value of the disability cost is ignored
and pooled among all the employers. In the next two years, both the average level and
the dispersion of the marginal costs increase, and in many cases the marginal costs are of
considerable size.
Figure 6 depicts the average marginal cost by age and α category in 2010 when the
transitional provisions no longer played a role anymore but when the employers' risk ratios
were solely determined by their own disability expenditures. Not surprisingly, the average
costs are rather low in relatively small ﬁrms with 0 < α ≤ 0.25. The average level is almost
threefold for the next size group with 0.25 < α ≤ 0.5, but it is considerably higher for the
two largest groups. Furthermore, the average marginal costs of workers around age 50 in
the ﬁrms with α > 0.5 are comparable in size to the annual salary. In all cases, the average
marginal cost begins to decline near the age of 54.14
Overall, there is considerable variation in the marginal costs across individuals and
ﬁrms at least during the years 2009 and 2010. Often these marginal costs are also rather
high, which is why the employers should respond to experience rating. Yet no evidence
of such behavioral eﬀects were found in the analysis of the risk ratios and the inﬂow
rates in Section 5. In the following subsection, we estimate the eﬀect of the marginal
14This is due to the age patterns of the beneﬁt level and multiplier γ, which jointly determine the present
value of a new pension claim (see the Appendix).
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Figure 5: The cumulative distribution function of the marginal costs for the employees of
ﬁrms with α > 0 in the years 2008, 2009 and 2010
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Figure 6: Average marginal cost (¿1000) as a function of age by α group in the year 2010








	
   	 
         	 
  

   
21
cost on the transition rates out of work to diﬀerent exit destinations. The larger number
of observations and within-ﬁrm variation in the cost measure allow us to estimate more
accurately the eﬀects of the experience rating than is possible in the ﬁrm-level analysis.
With the individual-level data, we can also examine whether the eﬀect of experience rating
varies with age and job tenure.
6.3 Eﬀects of marginal costs
Consider a worker who has worked in a given ﬁrm for the past two calendar years. In the
current year, the worker may still be employed in the same ﬁrm, may have stopped working
due to a disability, in which case he or she receives either rehabilitation or disability pension
beneﬁts,15 or this worker may have left the ﬁrm without becoming a disability beneﬁt
recipient. To test whether experience rating aﬀects these outcomes, we apply a standard
logistic regression. Speciﬁcally, we estimate a number of the binary logit models of the
form
ln
(
psjkt
1− psjkt
)
= λt + µ ·Xjkt + θ · cjkt, (10)
where psjkt is the probability that worker j occupies state s in year t, given that he or she
worked in ﬁrm k in years t − 1 and t − 2. The vector of control variables Xjkt includes
the worker's age xjt, lagged payroll Wk(t−1), job tenure and the industry dummies. The
variable of primary interest is the marginal cost, cjkt, which we deﬁned above. In some
models, we also add interactions of cjkt with the age and job tenure.
The marginal cost varies along with a number of dimensions. To make this explicit we
write
cjkt = gt
(
xjt,Wk(t−1), Qk(t−1), Qk(t−2), Qk(t−3); Ωt
)
,
where Ωt denotes the set of the pension system parameters and eˆjt. The marginal cost
is a function of worker's age (through the expected present value of a disability pension
eˆjt), the lagged payroll (through α) and the lagged base premiums (through the expected
calculatory term and theoretical costs), all of which vary over time. In addition, the
underlying technical parameters Ωt change annually. However, the most signiﬁcant point
is that gt(·) changes over time, which indicates that the mapping of the inputs of gt(·) into
the marginal cost changes over time. This occurs due to the gradual implementation of
experience rating, which is captured by the increasing probability of employer's liability
for the costs of a new disability pension (i.e. φˆt and φˆt+1) and by the diminishing role of
the calculatory term in the risk ratio formula. It should be emphasized that, apart from
the worker's age and the lagged payroll (if interpreted as a proxy for ﬁrm size), the inputs
of gt(·) cannot have a direct eﬀect on the outcome probability.
Because cjkt only depends on the worker's age, ﬁrm characteristics, system parameters
15Due to the small numbers of transitions to partial beneﬁts, we do not make a distinction between
full and partial rehabilitation beneﬁts, nor do we diﬀerentiate between full and partial disability pension
beneﬁts. Our results are not sensitive with respect to this.
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and time, it is independent of unobserved individual characteristics such as health and
preferences for work. We should not be concerned about unobserved ﬁrm characteristics
either. As the collective risk ratio of the LEL employers was used for the expected coun-
terfactual risk ratios, cjkt is independent of ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks that aﬀect the ﬁrm's past
and current disability inﬂow. Conditional on the age and lagged payroll, the variation in
cjkt stems from the gradual implementation of experience rating, i.e. changes in gt(·), and
to some extent from changes in the lagged base premiums and from the changes in the
technical parameters over time. Since these sources of variation are exogenous from the
perspectives of both the employer and employee, we can estimate the causal eﬀect of cjkt
from the model (10).
Using the data pooled over the years 2006-2010, we have estimated several model
variants. For the sake of brevity, we focus on the eﬀects of the marginal cost, which are
reported in Table 6. In addition to the coeﬃcients on cjkt and its possible interactions, we
report the average partial eﬀect (APE), which is deﬁned as the average eﬀect of cjkt on p
s
jkt
(accounting for the possible interactions with age and/or job tenure) across the employees
of ﬁrms with α > 0 in 2010. This gives the average response after the transition period
on workers whose employers were subject to experience rating. The reported z statistics
are based on the robust standard errors accounting for heteroscedasticity and cross-section
dependence within ﬁrms.16
The results in Panel A are from the baseline speciﬁcation that is outlined in (10).
These estimates indicate no eﬀect on the probability of being awarded a disability beneﬁt
because the APE on the receipt of both types of disability beneﬁts is zero up to the third
decimal place. On the other hand, the eﬀects on the probability of continuing to work in
the current ﬁrm and on that of other exits are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. These imply that an increase of ¿10,000 in the marginal costs among
all the employees whose employers were subject to experience rating in 2010 would raise
the average exit rate out of work for reasons other than disability by 0.005. This means a
less than 10% increase in the exit probability for the average worker (see Table 3). This
would also reduce the average probability of remaining employed in the current ﬁrm for one
additional year by 0.006. This is a very small eﬀect in relative terms because the average
probability of remaining employed in the current ﬁrm is as high as 0.93.
In Panels B, C and D, we allow the eﬀect of the marginal cost to change with age and/or
job tenure. Adding these interactions does not change the average eﬀect on the disability
beneﬁt claims as the APE remains robustly zero for both types of beneﬁts. However, the
age interaction on the probability of claiming a rehabilitation beneﬁt is signiﬁcant at the
10% level (Panels B and D), indicating that experience rating may have some positive eﬀect
16For the corresponding linear probability models, we computed one-way clustered (i.e. clustering on
ﬁrm or individual) and two-way clustered (i.e. clustering on both ﬁrm and individual) covariance-variance
matrices using the method by Cameron et al. (2011). Comparison of these estimates suggested that ignor-
ing the cross-sectional dependence in the unobservables would lead to clearly downward-biased standard
errors. By contrast, we found no evidence of signiﬁcant time-dependence in the unobservables for the same
individual. Thus it suﬃces to cluster the standard errors at the ﬁrm level.
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Table 6: The eﬀects of marginal costs in logit models
Outcome:
Stay employed Rehab beneﬁt Disab pension Other exit
Estimate z -value Estimate z -value Estimate z -value Estimate z -value
A. Baseline model
MC -0.0629** -2.11 0.0295 0.77 0.0012 0.02 0.0629* 1.85
APE -0.0062** -2.02 0.0003 0.77 0.0000 0.02 0.0053* 1.79
B. Age interaction
MC -0.0407 -1.07 0.0771 1.52 0.0031 0.05 0.0426 0.90
MC×(Age - 55) 0.0043 1.19 0.0132* 1.68 0.0112 0.61 -0.0037 -1.07
APE -0.0049 -1.45 0.0006 1.25 0.0003 0.36 0.0044 1.25
C. Tenure interaction
MC -0.0490* -1.76 0.0275 0.72 0.0017 0.03 0.0458 1.30
MC×(Tenure - 8) 0.0089** 1.97 0.0041 1.19 -0.0010 -0.19 -0.0089* -1.90
APE -0.0056** -2.19 0.0003 0.84 0.0000 0.00 0.0049* 1.86
D. Age and tenure interactions
MC -0.0330 -0.90 0.0746 1.45 0.0036 0.06 0.0316 0.67
MC×(Age - 55) 0.0032 1.03 0.0131* 1.65 0.0112 0.61 -0.0027 -0.87
MC×(Tenure - 8) 0.0086** 2.00 0.0040 1.14 -0.0009 -0.18 -0.0087* -1.92
APE -0.0047 -1.59 0.0006 1.31 0.0003 0.36 0.0043 1.36
E. Level dummies
1 (0 < MC ≤ 1) -0.0333 -0.43 -0.0792 -0.52 0.0790 0.48 0.0485 0.54
1 (1 < MC ≤ 2) -0.0966 -0.80 0.3594 1.41 0.3875 1.31 0.0199 0.15
1 (2 < MC ≤ 3) -0.1703 -1.30 -0.1778 -0.61 0.1173 0.41 0.2281 1.45
1 (3 < MC ≤ 4) -0.3017** -2.11 0.3434 1.11 -0.0095 -0.02 0.3033** 1.98
1 (4 < MC ≤ 5.5) -0.2224 -1.02 0.0593 0.20 -0.2139 -0.63 0.2556 1.03
1 (MC > 5.5) -0.3894** -2.24 0.3617 1.03 -0.0133 -0.01 0.3343* 1.81
APEs:
1 (0 < MC ≤ 1) -0.0030 -0.42 -0.0007 -0.52 0.0006 0.48 0.0037 0.54
1 (1 < MC ≤ 2) -0.0089 -0.79 0.0038 1.30 0.0036 1.22 0.0015 0.14
1 (2 < MC ≤ 3) -0.0161 -1.28 -0.0015 -0.63 0.0010 0.40 0.0186 1.42
1 (3 < MC ≤ 4) -0.0298** -1.96 0.0036 1.00 -0.0001 0.00 0.0254* 1.89
1 (4 < MC ≤ 5.5) -0.0214 -0.98 0.0005 0.20 -0.0015 -0.67 0.0211 0.99
1 (MC > 5.5) -0.0396** -2.12 0.0039 0.93 -0.0001 0.00 0.0283* 1.77
Notes: Marginal cost (MC) was computed using the smoothed experience multiplier, measured in 2010 euros
and divided by 10,000. All models includes age dummies, industry dummies, and the 3rd order polynomials for
lagged payroll and job tenure. 1 (A) is 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise. All models were estimated by Maximum
Likelihood. Unless otherwise stated, the estimates are the coeﬃcients of marginal cost and its interactions with
age/tenure. In Panels A to D, the average partial eﬀect (APE), or average marginal eﬀect, is the partial derivative
of the outcome probability accounting for possible interactions, averaged across the distribution of the covariates
for workers employed in experience-rated ﬁrms in 2010. In Panel E it is the similarly averaged discrete change in
the probability compared to the case of zero marginal cost. The z -values are based on the robust standard errors
clustered at the ﬁrm level. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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for the oldest workers. In Panels C and D, the tenure interaction on the probability of
other exits and on that of remaining at work is statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 10%
level. Thus, for a recently hired worker, the experience rating may increase the probability
of other exits and, consequently, decrease the probability of continuing employment in the
current ﬁrm. As an example, for a worker with two years of tenure, an increase of ¿10,000
in the marginal cost increases the probability of other exits by 0.016 (z -value 3.15) or
0.014 (z -value 2.59) according to the models in Panel C and D, respectively. It is possible
that the experience rating induces the employer to get rid of recently hired workers who
develop health problems. This eﬀect may not exist for more tenured workers who are better
protected due to the seniority rules.
The models considered so far imply a constant eﬀect on the odds ratios throughout
the range of marginal cost. To relax this assumption, we replaced the continuous marginal
cost variable by a set of dummy variables in the models reported in Panel E. The reference
category is no experience rating, corresponding to the case cjkt = 0. As in other models,
there is no eﬀect on the likelihood of becoming a disability beneﬁt recipient. However,
the experience rating aﬀects other outcomes, but only through the relatively large values
of marginal costs. The probability of other exits and that of remaining employed in the
current ﬁrm do not diﬀer from the reference level until the marginal cost exceeds ¿30,000.
After this point, the probability of other exits (remaining employed) increases (decreases).
These high values of marginal costs increase the probability of other exits by 0.02 to 0.03,
and decrease the likelihood of staying employed in the current ﬁrm by 0.03 to 0.04 on
average. The small diﬀerence between these eﬀects appears to be due to the increased
probability of the rehabilitation beneﬁt claim, but the estimated increase is very imprecise
and therefore needs to be interpreted with great caution. Note that the eﬀects of the
largest marginal costs on the probability of other exits are rather large also in relative
terms, albeit they are signiﬁcant only at the 10% level.
Due to a small number of partial beneﬁt claims, the transitions were combined into a
single outcome comprising partial and full beneﬁts of a given type. This may conceal the
true eﬀect of the marginal cost if experience rating reduces the inﬂow to full beneﬁts but
increases the inﬂow to partial beneﬁts. This is a relevant concern at least in the case of
disability pension claims. If one of the two disability pensions is to be claimed, the employer
has an incentive to induce the employee to claim a partial pension instead of the full pension
because the partial pension has a smaller impact on the risk ratio of the ﬁrm. For this
reason, we also estimated distinct models for full and partial beneﬁts. Without reporting
the detailed results here, we emphasize that these models do not produce statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects, and thereby the results in Table 6 are not sensitive with respect to our
decision to combine partial and full beneﬁts.
As a robustness check, we also estimated similar linear probability models. Table 7
presents these results for the baseline speciﬁcation (Panel A) and the model with the
marginal cost dummies (Panel B). The OLS estimates can be compared to the APEs from
the logit models in Panels A and E in Table 6, albeit one should keep in mind that the
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Table 7: The eﬀects of marginal costs in linear probability models
Outcome:
Stay employed Rehab beneﬁt Disab pension Other exit
Coeﬀ t-value Coeﬀ t-value Coeﬀ t-value Coeﬀ t-value
A. Baseline model
MC -0.0058 -1.56 0.0003 0.73 0.0001 0.33 0.0054 1.45
B. Level dummies
1 (0 < MC ≤ 1) -0.0030 -0.45 -0.0007 -0.52 0.0006 0.42 0.0030 0.47
1 (1 < MC ≤ 2) -0.0115 -1.07 0.0037 1.26 0.0050 1.36 0.0029 0.30
1 (2 < MC ≤ 3) -0.0137 -1.07 -0.0016 -0.65 0.0007 0.31 0.0146 1.12
1 (3 < MC ≤ 4) -0.0304* -1.65 0.0035 1.01 0.0000 0.01 0.0269 1.54
1 (4 < MC ≤ 5.5) -0.0175 -0.88 0.0005 0.18 0.0001 0.07 0.0168 0.87
1 (MC > 5.5) -0.0414 -1.55 0.0030 0.91 0.0017 0.73 0.0367 1.45
C. Baseline model with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
MC -0.0025 -1.17 0.0006** 2.01 -0.0001 -0.15 0.0019 0.88
D. Level dummies with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect
1 (0 < MC ≤ 1) -0.0011 -0.15 0.0006 0.30 -0.0010 -0.53 0.0015 0.22
1 (1 < MC ≤ 2) -0.0079 -0.64 0.0053* 1.66 0.0039 0.87 -0.0012 -0.12
1 (2 < MC ≤ 3) -0.0073 -0.89 -0.0001 -0.04 -0.0005 -0.16 0.0079 0.96
1 (3 < MC ≤ 4) -0.0166 -1.46 0.0064* 1.80 -0.0007 -0.24 0.0109 1.20
1 (4 < MC ≤ 5.5) -0.0048 -0.27 0.0023 0.90 -0.0014 -0.62 0.0039 0.24
1 (MC > 5.5) -0.0113 -0.71 0.0078** 2.34 -0.0005 -0.17 0.0040 0.26
Notes: Marginal cost (MC) was computed using the smoothed experience multiplier, measured in 2010 euros and
divided by 10,000. All models includes age dummies, industry dummies, and the 3rd order polynomials for lagged
payroll and job tenure. 1 (A) is 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise. The reference category for the level dummies is
MC = 0. The models in Panels A and B were estimated by Ordinary Least Squares, and those in Panels C and D
by the Fixed Eﬀects method. The t statistics are based on the robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level.
Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
APEs describe the average eﬀects for a given subgroup (the employees of experience-rated
ﬁrms in 2010). By and large, the OLS coeﬃcients are similar to the corresponding APEs
in Table 6, having always the same sign and being of the same magnitude. These OLS
estimates, however, are less precise: Out of the 28 OLS coeﬃcients in Panels A and B,
only 1 is (marginally) statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
In Panels C and D, we report the results for the linear probability models when esti-
mated by the Fixed Eﬀects (FE) method. The FE results do not imply any eﬀect on the
risk of becoming a disability pension recipient, which is in line with the OLS and logit
estimates. But, contrary to the OLS and logit estimates, some of the FE estimates on the
receipt of the rehabilitation beneﬁt are statistically signiﬁcant. In Panel C, the implied
eﬀect is rather small: An increase of ¿10,000 in the marginal cost would raise the probabil-
ity of being awarded a rehabilitation beneﬁt by 0.006, corresponding to a relative increase
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of about 7% in the average rehabilitation claim rate of 0.0091 (see Table 3). There are
greater eﬀects for the three marginal cost categories in Panel D, but only one of them is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level and the sizes of the eﬀects do not exhibit any clear
pattern. The FE estimates on the probabilities of other exits and remaining employed in
the current ﬁrm are smaller in absolute value than the corresponding OLS estimates and
APEs from the logit models. Moreover, none of these estimates are statistically signiﬁcant
at the conventional risk levels.
To conclude, our results suggest that experience rating has no impact on the likelihood
of being awarded a disability pension. This ﬁnding is highly robust, as the same conclusion
can be drawn from various speciﬁcations of the linear probability and logit models. While
this result is counter evidence for the ultimate goal of experience rating, it is in accordance
with our analysis of the risk ratios and inﬂow rates in Section 5.
Our other ﬁndings are less robust. In the logit analysis we found that the experience
rating may have a negative eﬀect on a worker's job tenure. This is because the probability
of a worker leaving his or her current ﬁrm without claiming disability beneﬁts increases with
the marginal cost. This eﬀect appears to be pronounced for recently hired employees, and
it is driven by the relatively high values of the marginal costs. However, the result is only
evident in the logit analysis as the corresponding eﬀects lose their statistical signiﬁcance
in the linear probability models.
Among the oldest workers, the experience rating may slightly increase the probability of
being awarded a rehabilitation beneﬁt. This conclusion should be interpreted with caution,
however, as the underlying age interaction is estimated rather imprecisely in the logit and
the FE models (signiﬁcant at the 10% level) while the OLS estimate is not signiﬁcant at
all (these linear probability model results were not reported). In addition, the FE models
without the age interactions also indicate some positive eﬀects, but these eﬀects do not
appear in the corresponding logit and OLS speciﬁcations. Despite these weak eﬀects in
some model speciﬁcations, the estimated eﬀects are predominantly zero. Taken together
with our fractional logit results that indicate no eﬀect on the rehabilitation beneﬁt inﬂow,
this leads us to conclude that experience rating has a negligible eﬀect on the transitions to
rehabilitation beneﬁts.
7 Concluding remarks
This study contributes to understanding better the eﬃciency of experience rating as a
disability prevention device. Our calculations of the marginal costs demonstrate that a
new disability pension claimant can cause substantial cost to the former employer through
an increase in the DI premium. Given the size of the potential costs, the experience rating
should promote preventive health and safety practices, and encourage employers to keep
their employees with work limitations at work.
However, our results suggest that experience rating is not succeeding in reducing dis-
ability beneﬁt claims. We did not ﬁnd declines in the post-reform risk ratios or in the
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disability inﬂow rates for the large ﬁrms that became exposed to experience rating. We
also did not ﬁnd evidence that the marginal cost would have reduced the individual-speciﬁc
transition rates to disability pension beneﬁts. The only possible eﬀects of the marginal cost
(yet not very robust) were an increase in the likelihood of leaving the current employer for
reasons other than disability and an associated decrease in job tenure. Thus, experience
rating does not have desired eﬀects on disability beneﬁt claims and employment among
older workers.
From the description of the institutional framework and our marginal cost calculations
it is evident that the design of the Finnish experience rating scheme is rather complex.
A long delay, of possibly several years, between a medical diagnosis of disability and a
possible increase in the experience-rated premium may hinder employers from recognizing
the causes for premium changes. The transitional provisions of the TyEL reform further
complicated the assignment of the disability pension costs to the former LEL employers.
It might be that many employers were unable to respond to economic incentives because
they were unaware of the details of the new experience rating system. If so, a desired eﬀect
of experience rating may become apparent only after a longer period of time when the
employers had better understood how the complex DI system works and have gradually
experienced the impact of their own claim history on the DI premiums.
It should be emphasized that we considered a rather special group of workers and
employers. The former LEL sector covered workers in short-term employment. If the
eﬀect of the experience rating varies by sector, our pessimistic results may not apply to
other sectors. Due to the short-term employment contracts, the former LEL employers may
have both weaker incentives and weaker opportunities to inﬂuence their employees' health
and well-being. The short-term contracts may also oﬀer employers a better opportunity
to avoid cost liabilities by laying oﬀ the workers with a high disability risk. These factors
may have diluted the eﬀect of the experience rating among the former LEL employers.
For the reasons discussed above, it may be a slightly premature to conclude that the
experience rating in DI has no eﬀect whatsoever. And even without the desired behavioral
eﬀects, the experience rating system still provides a means of allocating the overall costs
of the disability beneﬁts more equitably among individual employers.
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Appendix: Technical details
Here we discuss the computation of various terms needed for the risk ratios and marginal
costs. Some underlying parameter values are shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Some parameters
t β0t β
1
t β
2
t r
LEL
t W t W t φˆt
2004 0.14 0.63 0.12 1.85 1 500 000 24 000 000
2005 0.16 0.41 0.33 2.07 1 542 000 24 672 000
2006 0.56 0.19 0.21 1.38 1 639 146 26 226 336
2007 0.04 0.64 0.22 1.46 1 803 061 28 848 970
2008 0.04 0.14 0.49 2.11 2 026 640 32 426 242 0.0863
2009 0.05 0.14 0.26 2.22 2 415 755 38 652 080 0.4329
2010 0.05 0.13 0.24 0.7673
2011 0.8766
Terms for risk ratios
We need to compute the risk ratios for the years 2005-2010. The theoretical disability cost,
the denominator of the risk ratio, is calculated as a weighted sum of the base premiums:
Rkt =
β0tQkt + β1tQk(t−1) + β2tQk(t−2), t < 2006β0tQk(t−1) + β1tQk(t−2) + β2tQk(t−3), t ≥ 2007, (11)
where βt's are parameters computed by the pension provider.
For the adjusted risk ratios we also need the calculatory term which is given by
Ek08 =
1
2
(
rLEL08 + r
LEL
07
) · (β108Qk06 + β208Qk05) ,
Ek09 =
1
2
(
rLEL09 + r
LEL
08
) · β209Qk06, (12)
Ekt = 0, t ≥ 2010
where rLELt is the collective risk ratio of all the (former) LEL employers in year t, which
is computed by the pension provider.
Expected counterfactual risk ratio in year t
To compute rˆAkt we need expected values for
∑
j∈Dkt ejt , Rkt, and Ekt for the years 2008-
2010; see (4). We compute the expected theoretical disability cost as
Rˆkt = β
0
t−1Qk(t−1) + β
1
t−1Qk(t−2) + β
2
t−1Qk(t−3), (13)
which diﬀers from (11) only in that the unknown βt's are replaced by their lagged values,
which are assumed to be known at the beginning of year t. The expected calculatory term
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is obtained by replacing the unknown parameters rLELt and βt's in (12) with their latest
realized values from year t− 1, so that
Eˆk08 = r
LEL
07 ·
(
β107Qk06 + β
2
07Qk05
)
,
Eˆk09 = r
LEL
08 · β208Qk06, (14)
Eˆk10 = 0.
To derive the expected realized disability cost, we ﬁrst assume that the expected un-
adjusted risk ratio for year t equals rLELt−1 , that is, the risk ratio without the transitional
provisions (i.e. without the calculatory term but assigning all realized disability costs, in-
cluding those associated with the employment relationships that fell in the LEL period, to
the former employer) equals the last year's collective risk ratio. In other words, the relative
costs of the ﬁrm's disability pension claims equals the last year's sectoral average. Under
this assumption rLELt−1 Rˆkt equals the expected realized disability cost, had the TyEL been
in force for a long time. In reality, the employer's accountability for these costs only covers
the TyEL years of the underlying employment relationships. To take this into account, we
multiply these costs with the probability that the costs of disability pensions awarded in
year t would be assigned to the former employer, φˆt (this parameter is deﬁned below). It
follows that the expected realized disability cost under the transitional provisions, i.e. the
expected value of
∑
j∈Dkt ejt in the adjusted risk ratio, equals φˆtr
LEL
t−1 Rˆkt . Now, we obtain
rˆAkt =
φˆtr
LEL
t−1 Rˆkt + Eˆkt
Rˆkt
= φˆtr
LEL
t−1 +
Eˆkt
Rˆkt
. (15)
Expected counterfactual risk ratio in year t+ 1
In an analogous way to rˆAkt we compute
rˆAk(t+1) = φˆt+1r
LEL
t−1 +
Eˆk(t+1)
Rˆk(t+1)
, (16)
where the expected unadjusted risk ratio for year t+ 1 is assumed to be equal to rLELt−1 . To
obtain Rˆk(t+1) and Eˆk(t+1), we simply replace the parameters values in (4) and (12) that
are not known at the beginning of year t (these also include Qkt) by their latest realized
values from year t− 1. In doing so, we get
Rˆk(t+1) =
(
β0t−1 + β
1
t−1
)
Qk(t−1) + β2t−1Qk(t−2) (17)
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and
Eˆk09 = r
LEL
07 · β207Qk06,
Eˆk10 = 0, (18)
Eˆk11 = 0.
The present value of a new disability pension claim
The present value is estimated as eˆjt = γ(xjt)bˆjt, where γ is a decreasing function of
the age at which the disability pension is awarded, xjt, and bˆjt is the estimated annual
disability pension beneﬁt. The multiplier γ is used by all pension providers. It depends on
the average duration of disability pension receipt of persons who were awarded a disability
pension at a given age. It also accounts for the (average) probability that the recipient
returns to work and the (average) survival probability until the old-age pension. For the
age group included in our analysis, γ takes values from 10.6 at age 45 to 1.4 at age 61.
To obtain bˆjt we regress (earnings-related) disability pension beneﬁts on age and lin-
ear time trend, using the data on employees who were insured under the LEL and were
awarded a disability pension between the ages of 45 and 61. We use only the data from
the LEL period because for the pension beneﬁts awarded in the TyEL period it is diﬃcult
to distinguish the beneﬁts accrued from employment spells covered by the LEL scheme
from other pension beneﬁts. Since we do not make a distinction between a partial and
full disability pension, the predicted pension beneﬁt equals the expected value over the
two beneﬁt types, suggesting that the likelihood of being awarded either a partial or a full
disability pension is implicitly accounted for.
Employer's accountability for new pension claims
We estimate φˆt using average diﬀerences in the years of the retirement event and disability
pension receipt among all new pension recipients who worked under the LEL scheme. Let
ϕs be the fraction of disability pensions with diﬀerence s between the year of the retirement
event and the year when the disability pension was awarded. Using data on all disability
pensions awarded in the period 2007-2010 for the former LEL employees, these values are:
ϕ0 = 0.1725, ϕ1 = 0.5208, ϕ2 = 0.1479 and ϕ3 = 0.0707. We deﬁne
φˆ2008 = 0.5ϕ0,
φˆ2009 = ϕ0 + 0.5ϕ1, (19)
φˆ2010 = ϕ0 + ϕ1 + 0.5ϕ2,
φˆ2011 = ϕ0 + ϕ1 + ϕ2 + 0.5ϕ3.
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Note that the underlying assumption is that one-half of the costs of a disability pension
awarded in 2008 is assigned to the former employer, that is, one-half of the present value
of such a pension is accounted for when determining the employer's risk ratio.
As an example, let us consider the allocation of the costs of disability pensions that
were awarded in 2010 for individuals who worked for a given employer. The employer is
fully liable for the costs of those pensions which retirement event was either in 2010 or
2009 (expected shares of ϕ0 and ϕ1, respectively), and partially liable for those with the
retirement event in 2008 (expected share of 0.5ϕ2). The rest of the costs (expected share
of 1− ϕ0 − ϕ1 − 0.5ϕ2) are pooled as the underlying employment relationships took place
entirely in the LEL period.
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